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Abstract
This paper considers a general and informationally eﬃcient approach to deter-
mine the optimal access pricing rule for interconnected networks. It shows that there
exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium
when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination.
The approach is informationally eﬃcient in the sense that the regulator is required
to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and
terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not
only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed
by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the
set of linear access pricing rules which includes any ￿xed access price, the Eﬃcient
Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modi￿ed ECPR as special cases. I show
that in this set, there is a unique rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the
unique equilibrium independently of the underlying demand conditions.
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Access pricing rules constitute the core of the policy issues regarding interconnected net-
works. More precisely, studying how access prices aﬀect competition between networks
and determining the optimal access prices form the central questions of the seminal papers
on two-way network interconnection in Telecommunication Industry (Armstrong 1998,
Laﬀont-Rey-Tirole (LRT, hereafter), 1998a,b) and the papers that followed.1 Although
the papers vary in terms of the retail prices they consider (linear versus non-linear prices,
with or without network based price discrimination), the degree of customer heterogeneity
and whether or not they explicitly consider receivers etc., all the papers have a common
trait in that they consider a ￿xed access price. This approach may not be restrictive
when networks compete in two-part tariﬀs as long as we neglect call externality2 since
LRT (1998a,b) show that in this case, by choosing an access price equal to the termination
cost, one can achieve the Ramsey outcome. In contrast, when networks compete in linear
prices, the results obtained with this approach are not satisfactory. More precisely, LRT
(1998a) ￿nd that when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price
discrimination3 (i) the Ramsey access price must be lower than the termination cost but
the equilibrium does not exist if the access price is diﬀerent from the termination cost and
the services provided by diﬀerent networks are substitutable enough (ii) if access prices
are determined through private negotiations, networks can achieve the monopoly outcome
by coordinating on a certain level of access price. Furthermore, their Ramsey access price
is informationally demanding since it requires the regulator to possess precise information
regarding both the cost and the demand structure.
In this paper, I consider a general and informationally eﬃcient approach to determine
the optimal access pricing rule and show that there exists a simple rule that achieves
the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices
without network-based price discrimination. My approach is informationally eﬃcient in
the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the
marginal cost of realizing and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access
1See, for instances, Carter and Wright (1999, 2003), Dessein (2003), Gans and King (2000, 2001),
Hahn (2004), Hermalin and Katz (2001, 2004), Laﬀont-Marcus-Rey-Tirole, (2003), Jeon-Laﬀont-Tirole
(2004), Valletti and Cambini (forthcoming), Wright (2002).
2See the conclusion for the discussion of the case of competition with two-part tariﬀs in the presence
of call externality.
3The results under linear pricing with network-based price discrimination have a similar ￿avor: see
LRT (1998b).
1prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices which can
be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider
the set of linear access pricing rules in which the access price mark-up with respect to the
termination cost is a linear function of the retail prices and the marginal cost of a call.
The set includes any ￿xed access price and the Eﬃcient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR)
as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique access rule that implements the
Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand con-
ditions, as long as there exists at least a mild degree of substitutability between networks￿
services.
Making access prices depend on retail prices is an old idea in the case of one-way
access. The well-known ECPR4 achieves the eﬃcient entry by equalizing the access price
that an entrant should pay to the incumbent with the sum of the cost of providing the
access and the latter￿s opportunity cost (i.e. the incumbent￿s retail price mark-up) when
the incumbent￿s retail price is regulated. However, the ECPR is not good at promoting
competition in retail prices when the retail prices are not regulated since the access price
that the incumbent receives increases with its retail price. This motivated Sibley et al.
(2004) to consider the Generalized Eﬃcient Component Pricing Rule (GECPR) in which
the access price that an entrant pays is, roughly speaking, equal to the sum of the cost
of providing the access and the entrant￿s opportunity cost (i.e. the entrant￿s retail price
mark-up). Sibley et al. (2004) ￿nd that since the entrant can reduce its access charge
payment by lowering its retail price, the GECPR is good at intensifying retail competition.
In the case of two-way access, LRT (1998a) examine various interpretations of the
ECPR and show that when networks can privately negotiate on a ￿xed level of access
price, the ECPR allows them to achieve the monopoly outcome. More importantly, Mi-
alon (2004) studies the Modi￿ed Eﬃcient Component Pricing Rule (MECPR) in LRT￿s
framework.5 Her MECPR is essentially the same as the GECPR considered by Sibley
et al. (2004) and therefore the mark-up of the access price that network i pays to other
network(s) is equal to the former￿s retail price mark-up. She ￿nds that there always exists
4See Baumol (1983), Baumol and Sidak (1994) and Willig (1979). For an introduction to the ECPR,
see Armstrong (2002) and Laﬀont and Tirole (2000).
5Doganoglu and Tauman (2002) also consider a linear access pricing rule which depends on retail
price. More precisely, in their paper, the access price that network i receives from network j is a (positive
and) constant fraction of the linear retail price that network i charges. This rule is included as a special
case in the set of the access pricing rules that I consider. As is explained in section 3.4, this kind of rule
cannot be optimal since network i has an incentive to increase (instead of reducing) its retail price in
order to receive a higher access payment.
2a unique equilibrium and that the equilibrium retail price is lower than any equilibrium
price obtained with a ￿xed access price larger than the termination cost. Although the
MECPR has some desirable properties, its conceptual foundation is weak as long as retail
competition is the main issue: there is no rationale for making the mark-up of the access
price that network i pays to other network(s) exactly equal to the former￿s retail price
mark-up except for the intuition that this reduces each network￿s incentive to choose a
high retail price. Since this intuition does not involve the opportunity cost reasoning that
underlies the ECPR and since, a priori, any access pricing rule that makes the access price
that network i pays to other network(s) increase with the network i￿s retail price has the
same eﬀect of promoting retail competition, there is no particular reason to choose the
MECPR. In fact, I show that there exists a unique rule achieving the Ramsey outcome
in the set of linear access pricing rules which includes the MECPR as a special case, and
the optimal rule is diﬀerent from the MECPR, which implies that the MECPR does not
achieve the Ramsey outcome.6 A remarkable feature of the unique optimal access pricing
rule is that it does not depend on the demand structure under the full coverage assump-
tion, which is assumed by LRT; the regulator does not need to know anything about
the demand side. Furthermore, both LRT and Mialon consider duopoly in the Hotelling
model with constant elasticity demand function while I consider a general model of hor-
izontal diﬀerentiation in which both the Hotelling model and the circular city model are
special cases and show that the key insight of the main result obtained in the duopoly
case extends to the case of n-network competition.
In practice, there are cases in which access prices (or termination charges) depend
on retail tariﬀs. In the context of termination charges for mobile phone service, the
Australian competition and consumer commission (2001) adopted what they call ￿retail
benchmarking approach￿ which means that ￿access prices for GSM termination will fall
at the same rate as retail prices for mobile services provided by a mobile carrier (p.89).￿
This paper provides a theoretical support for the retail benchmarking approach although
it does not apply the framework to mobile phone communications.7
Section 2 presents the general model, de￿nes the set of linear access pricing rules and
characterizes the Ramsey outcome. Section 3 establishes the main result and compares
diﬀerent access pricing rules. Section 4 discusses the robustness of the result to introducing
6In fact, the equilibrium price under the MECPR is higher than the Ramsey price.
7Another example of pegging access price to retail tariﬀs can be found in the international postal
service. For instance, access prices (i.e. what they call ￿termination dues￿) among European countries
should be set at 80% of domestic tariﬀs (Ghosal, 2002).
3receivers￿ surplus, to relaxing the full coverage assumption and to introducing network-
based price discrimination. Section 5 concludes.
2 Framework
2.1 The model
Ip r e s e n tt h eg e n e r a lm o d e lo fn-network competition which includes the duopoly model
of LRT (1998a) as a special case. There is a mass one of consumers. There are n ≥ 2
number of networks having the same cost structure that is speci￿ed below. They compete
in linear prices and each network can cover all the consumers. Let p ≡ (p1,...,pn) ∈ <n
+
represent the vector of retail prices and let p−i ≡ (p1,..,pi−1,p i+1,...,pn).
￿ Firm￿s demand (or market share):
The networks (i.e. ￿rms) provide horizontally diﬀerentiated services and we assume
that the measure of consumers subscribing to network i, denoted by αi(pi;p−i),s a t i s ￿es
the following properties:
Property 1 (symmetry): for any i,j =1 ,...,n and i 6= j and for any p and pi,
αi(pi;p,...,p)=αj(pj;p,...,p) if pi = pj.
Property 2 (monotonicity):f o ra n yi,j =1 ,...,n and i 6= j, αi(pi;p−i) is diﬀer-
entiable with respect to each retail price and decreases with pi and increases with pj;i t
strictly decreases with pi and strictly increases with pj for αi ∈ (0,1).8
Property 3 (full coverage):
Pn
i=1 αi(pi;p−i)=1for all relevant p ∈ <n
+.
The three properties are satis￿ed by the Hotelling model of LRT (1998a) and the circu-
lar city model with n =2or 3 (Salop, 1979).9 T h es y m m e t r ya n dt h ef u l lc o v e r a g ei m p l y
8Property 2 can be more rigorously de￿ned as follows. Given p−i,l e tp
i be the maximum pi ∈ <+
making αi(pi;p−i)=1and let pi be the minimum pi ∈ <+ making αi(pi;p−i)=0 . If the maximum
does not exist, we take p
i =0and if the minimum does not exist, we take pi = ∞. Then, αi strictly





. Similarly, given p−j with j 6= i,l e tp
j be the maximum pj ∈ <+
making αi(pi;p−i)=0and let pi be the minimum pj ∈ <+ making αi(pi;p−i)=1 . If the maximum does
not exist, we take p
j =0and if the minimum does not exist, we take pj = ∞. Then, αi strictly increases






9For n>3, our model is more natural than the circular city model since in the latter, a minor price
change of network i aﬀects only the demands of its direct neighbors (network i − 1 and network i +1 )
but does not aﬀect the demands of other neighbors.
4αi = 1
n for all i =1 ,...,n if pi = p for all i =1 ,...,n. Regarding the full coverage property,
LRT (1998a) assume that each consumer derives a constant utility from subscribing to
one of the networks, which is large enough to ensure that all consumers always choose to
join one of the networks. Since the total mass of consumers is equal to one, under the full
coverage, the mass of consumers subscribing to network i (i.e. αi) is equal to network i￿s
market share.
￿ Cost:
Concerning the cost side, I use the same technology that is used in LRT (1998a).
Serving a customer involves a ￿xed cost f>0, say of connecting the customer￿s home to
the network and of billing and serving her. A network also incurs a marginal cost c0 per
call at the originating and terminating ends of the call and marginal cost c1 in between.
Therefore, the total marginal cost of a call is
c ≡ 2c0 + c1.
￿ Individual demand:
Let u(q) be the utility that a consumer derives from placing q volume of calls. The
utility function u(•) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, with u0 > 0,u 00 < 0, which implies
that demand function is diﬀerentiable. Let q(.) denote the demand function, given by
u0(q(p)) = p: the volume of calls placed by a customer of network i is given by q(pi).L e t
v(p) be the indirect utility function, i.e.,
v(p)=m a x
q {u(q) − pq)}.
Let R(p) ≡ (p − c)q(p) represent the revenue per consumer. We assume that R(p) is
strictly concave with R(∞)=0and has a unique maximum at p = pm with c<p m < ∞;
therefore, pm denotes the monopoly price. Let Rm denote the monopoly revenue per
consumer (i.e. Rm = R(pm)). We assume Rm >f.
2.2 Access pricing rules
I consider simple access pricing rules which are not informationally demanding. More
precisely, the informational constraint that the regulator faces is de￿ned as follows.
￿ The regulator￿s informational constraint:
5On the one hand, I assume that the regulator (or the competition authority) has
limited information about the market such that she is not informed about the individual
demand q(p),e a c h￿rm￿s demand (hence αi(p)) and the value of the ￿xed cost f.O n
the other hand, she knows the marginal costs (c,c0). Furthermore, she and consumers
observe retail prices (p1,p 2).
The ￿rms are assumed to know all the relevant information regarding both the demand
and the cost sides.
￿ The linear access pricing rules:
Let aij with i 6= j denote the access charge that network i receives from network j.I n
order to consider simple rules, I limit my attention to the following linear access pricing
rule:
aij − c0 = h(pi,p j,c)=h1pi + h2pj + h3c + h4 for any i,j =1 ,...,n and i 6= j,( 1 )
where (h1,h 2,h 3,h 4) ∈ <4 is a vector of constants. Note that I consider a reciprocal access
pricing rule since the coeﬃcients (h1,h 2,h 3,h 4) do not depend on ￿rms￿ identities. This is
without loss of generality given that I consider symmetric networks.10 Let ΛL
n be the set
of linear access pricing rules satisfying the above form (1). Some special cases of linear
access pricing rules are:
￿ Marginal cost pricing rule: aij = c0.
￿ Eﬃcient component pricing rule (ECPR): aij − c0 = pi − c.
￿ Modi￿ed eﬃcient component pricing rule (MECPR): aij − c0 = pj − c.
In the case of the ECPR, the access price that network j pays to network i is the sum
of the termination cost and network i￿s opportunity cost (i.e. its retail price mark-up).
In contrast, in the case of the MECPR, the access price that network j pays to network
i is the sum of the termination cost and network j￿s opportunity cost (Sibley et al. 2000,
Mialon 2004).
2.3 Ramsey benchmark
For future reference, we derive the social optimum in the ideal case in which the regulator
knows all the relevant information and can dictate the prices under the constraint that
10In the case of asymmetric networks, we need to consider non-reciprocal rules such that the coeﬃcients
depend on the ￿rms￿ identities. See Carter and Wright (2003) for the study of asymmetric networks.




αi(p)v(pi) − T [α1(p),...,αn(p)] (2)
where T(α1,...,αn) denotes the average consumer￿s utility from not being able to consume
her preferred service. We assume that T(α) is minimized at equal market share αi = 1
n.




Maximizing (2) subject to (3) yields a symmetric solution, pi = pR for all i =1 ,...,n,
where the Ramsey price pR is the lowest price that satis￿es the budget constraint:
R(p
R)=f.
Since we assume Rm >f,w eh a v epR <p m.L e tq(pR) ≡ qR.
2.4 The main assumption and the timing
Since R(p) is strictly concave and continuous with R(∞)=0 ,t h e r ee x i s t sap such that
R(p)=f with p>p m. In what follows, we make the following assumption on the degree
of substitutability among the networks:
Assumption 1: The services provided by the networks are at least mildly substi-
tutable in the sense that αi(p;p−i)=0at p−i =( pR,...,pR).
Assumption 1 says that there is a minimum degree of substitutability among the
networks such that if a network charges p(>p m) while all the other networks charge the
Ramsey price, then the former gets zero market share. Since p is much larger than pm,
the assumption implies that the services provided by the networks are at least mildly
substitutable.
The timing of the game I consider is the following:
1. The regulator (or the competition authority) chooses a linear access pricing rule in
ΛL
n.
2. Each network simultaneously chooses its retail price.
3. Consumers make subscription and consumption decisions.
73 The main result
I ￿rst state the main result.
Proposition 1 Under assumption 1, for any demand structure satisfying Properties 1-3,
there is a unique linear access pricing rule in ΛL
n de￿ned by aij − c0 = n
n−1(pj − c) that
implements, independently of the underlying demand conditions,
(i) the Ramsey outcome (pi = pR for all i =1 ,...,n) as the unique symmetric equilib-
rium for n ≥ 2
(ii) the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium for n =2 .
Note ￿rst the remarkable result that the optimal rule implementing the Ramsey out-
come does not depend on the demand structure as long as it satis￿es Properties 1-3.
Proposition 1(ii) is stronger than Proposition 1(i) since in the former, I prove that no
asymmetric equilibrium exists: Although I did not prove that no asymmetric equilibrium
exists for n ≥ 3, I conjecture that it would hold.11 In what follows, I prove Proposition
1(i) step by step in the main texts and provide the intuition. The proof that no asymmet-
ric equilibrium exists for n =2is done in Appendix. At the end of the section, I compare
diﬀerent access pricing rules in an intuitive way.
Given a linear access pricing rule belonging to ΛL
n and under the assumption of bal-
anced calling patterns12, the pro￿to fn e t w o r ki is given by:
πi(pi : p−i)=αi{(pi − c)q(pi) − f} +
X
j6=i
αiαj {h(pi,p j,c)q(pj) − h(pj,p i,c)q(pi)}, (4)
where the ￿rst term represents the retail pro￿t and the second term represents the net
access revenue (or de￿cit).
3.1 Uniqueness of the candidate rule to achieve the Ramsey
outcome
I show that among all the access pricing rules belonging to ΛL
n, there is a unique candidate
rule that satis￿es a necessary condition to implement the Ramsey outcome (pi = pR for
11To prove this, we need to de￿ne Property 1 (Symmetry) with respect to any permutation of prices.
12The assumption is from LRT (1998a, b). It means that a consumer has an equal chance of calling
a given consumer belonging to his network and another given consumer belonging to any other rival
network.






{(pi − c)q(pi) − f} + αi
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Since πi is a continuous function of pi, a necessary condition to implement the Ramsey
outcome is that the ￿rst-order derivative is zero at pi = pR when all the other networks
charge pj = pR for j 6= i and j =1 ,...,n.S i n c e R(pR)=f and h(pi,p j,c)q(pj)=
h(pj,p i,c)q(pi) at the symmetric equilibrium candidate with the Ramsey price, the ￿rst
and the third terms are zero in the above ￿rst-order derivative. Since q(pi)=qR and
αi = 1
n for i =1 ,...,n at the symmetric equilibrium candidate, the necessary condition











R + h3c + h4
i
=0 .
Given the regulator￿s informational constraint introduced in section 2.2, we ￿nd from the
two conditions that h1 =0 ,h 2 = n
n−1,h 3c+h4 = − n
n−1c. Therefore, we obtain the unique
candidate in the set of linear access pricing rules as follows:




3.2 Existence of the symmetric equilibrium
I now show that under the access pricing rule aij−c0 = n
n−1(pj−c) and under assumption
1, the symmetric equilibrium with pi = pR for i =1 ,...,n always exists. Given the access
pricing rule aij − c0 = n
n−1(pj − c),n e t w o r ki￿s pro￿ti sg i v e nb y :






αj [R(pj) − R(pi)] (6)
Suppose that all the other networks except network 1 charge pR. Then, because of the
symmetry and the full coverage, we have α2 = ... = αn = 1−α1




R)=α1 [R(p1) − f]+
n
n − 1
α1(1 − α1)[f − R(pi)]







Note ￿rst that π1 =0when p1 = pR and π1 =0for p1 ≥ p under assumption 1. Consider
any p1 with p1 <p R. Then, we have α1 > 1





. Then, we have α1 < 1
n and R(p1) >f , implying π1 < 0 if α1 > 0.
Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium always exists.
To give the intuition, I consider the case of n =2and examine network 1￿s price choice




.I n t h i s c a s e , n e t w o r k 1￿s retail pro￿tp e r
customer is R(p1)−f>0. Its access revenue per customer is 2(1−α1)R(p2)=2 ( 1−α1)f
while its access payment per customer is 2(1−α1)R(p1), implying that it has a net access
de￿cit per customer equal to 2(1 − α1)[f − R(p1)].S i n c e α1 < 1





access de￿cit is larger than the retail pro￿t and therefore the ￿rm makes a loss. In contrast,
i nt h ec a s eo fp1 <p R,t h e￿rm has a retail de￿cit per customer equal to R(p1) − f<0
while it has a net access pro￿t per customer equal to 2(1−α1)[f − R(p1)].S i n c eα1 > 1
2,
the access pro￿t is not large enough to cover the retail de￿cit and the ￿rm￿s pro￿t is still
negative. In other words, the coeﬃcient in the optimal linear access pricing rule (2 when





retail pro￿t per communication is equal to its net access de￿cit per communication but,
since its market share is smaller than a half, the total amount of on-net communications
is smaller than the total amount of oﬀ-net communications, implying that it makes a loss
(iii) when p1 <p R, its retail de￿cit per communication is equal to its net access revenue
per communication but, since its market share is larger than a half, the total amount
of on-net communications is larger than the total amount of oﬀ-net communications,
implying that it makes a loss.
Note that in LRT (1998a), the non-existence of equilibrium occurs since a network can
have an incentive to corner the market by deviating to a price lower than the price in the
equilibrium candidate. In our equilibrium achieving the Ramsey outcome, the cornering
strategy does not make any sense since it requires the deviating network to charge a price
lower than pR, implying that the ￿rm makes a loss after cornering the market.
103.3 Non-existence of other symmetric equilibrium
I now show that under the access pricing rule aij−c0 = n
n−1(pj−c) and under assumption
1, no other symmetric equilibrium exists except pi = pR for i =1 ,...,n.L e t p be a
symmetric equilibrium candidate. First, it is obvious that neither p<p R nor p>p can





.C o n s i d e r ￿rst p = p. Then, each ￿rm gets zero pro￿t without deviation.
Suppose now that network 1 deviates to p1 = pm while all the other networks continue to









m − f] > 0,
where α1 = α1(pm;p,...,p) > 1
n. Therefore, no symmetric equilibrium with p = p exists.




. Then, from (6), the ￿rst-order derivative of πi with
respect to pi is given by:
∂πi(pi : p−i)
∂pi






























At pi = p for i =1 ,...,n,s i n c e
P
j6=i αj = n−1
n ,t h e￿rst-order derivative is given by:
∂πi(p : p,...,p)
∂pi
=[ R(p) − f]
∂αi
∂pi






Therefore, each ￿rm has an incentive to undercut and no other symmetric equilibrium
exists.
The access price rule aij −c0 = n
n−1(pj −c) intensi￿es retail price competition since by
reducing pj network j can reduce the access price that it should pay to the rival networks.
In particular, at any symmetric price p that allows networks to realize a positive retail
pro￿t (i.e. R(p) >f), each network has an incentive to choose a price lower than p.F r o m
(7), when network i reduces its retail price, there are three eﬀects on its pro￿t. First,
given its retail price, its retail pro￿t increases through its expansion of market share.
Second, given each network￿s market share, its retail revenue per consumer decreases
while its access payment per consumer decreases as well. Third, given each network￿s
retail price, the changes in the market shares aﬀect its net access payment. In any




for i =1 ,...,n,t h es e c o n da n d
the third eﬀects are zero and the ￿rst is positive. Therefore, each ￿rm has an incentive
to deviate in order to increase its market share.
113.4 Comparison with other rules when n =2
Suppose that the regulator should choose an access pricing rule without knowing the
demand structure while she only knows the marginal cost structure (c,c0).C o n s i d e r
duopolistic competition13 and, for simplicity, let ai denote the access charge that network
i receives from the rival network. Then, from Proposition 1(ii), we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 Under assumption 1, the social welfare is strictly higher under the access
pricing rule ai−c0 =2 ( pj −c) than under any other ￿xed access price (including ai = c0),
under the ECPR (ai − c0 = pi − c) and under the MECPR (ai − c0 = pj − c).
In order to give the intuition, I examine the ￿rst order derivative of network i￿s pro￿t
in each access pricing rule assuming that a symmetric equilibrium with p1 = p2 = p<p m
exists under each rule.
First, under a ￿xed and reciprocal access price rule a1 = a2 = a,n e t w o r ki￿s pro￿ti s
given by:
πi(pi;pj)=αi [R(pi) − f]+αi(1 − αi)(a − c0)[q(pj) − q(pi)].















Consider ￿rst the case of the marginal cost pricing (a = c0). In this case, for any market
share, each network has zero net access pro￿t. Since dαi
dpi < 0 < dRi
dpi ,t h e￿rst order
condition holds only for p>p R such that R(p) >f . Hence, the marginal cost pricing
cannot achieve the Ramsey outcome. From (9), it is clear that as the access price becomes
larger than the termination cost, network i has an extra incentive to raise pi since by
reducing the demand of its own customers, it can reduce its access payment. Since
an increase in the reciprocal access price results in an increase in the retail price, LRT
(1998a) ￿nd that networks can achieve the monopoly outcome if they can choose access
price through private negotiation. In contrast, as the access price becomes smaller than
the termination cost, network i has an extra incentive to reduce pi in order to increase
its access revenue. This is why LRT (1998a) ￿nd that the Ramsey access charge requires
13Although I restrict my attention to the case of n =2since non-existence of asymmetric equilibrium
is not proved for n>2, the intuition obtained in this section applies to the case of n>2 as well.
12an access charge lower than the termination cost. More precisely, they ￿nd that Ramsey









where η is the elasticity of demand and is assumed to be constant and larger than 1. Note
that in order to be able to compute the Ramsey access price, the regulator should have a
precise knowledge about the demand structure such that she should be able to compute
η, pm and pR. Furthermore, LRT (1998a) show that the equilibrium does not exist for
a 6= c0 if the degree of substitutability of the two networks is high enough.
Second, in the case of the ECPR, network i￿s pro￿ti sg i v e nb y :
πi(pi;pj)=αi [R(pi) − f]+αi(1 − αi)[q(pj)(pi − c) − q (pi)(pj − c)].


















The ￿rst two terms in (10) are what we found in the ￿rst-order derivative under a = c0
a n dh a v et od ow i t ht h er e t a i lp r o ￿t. The last term in (10) has to do with the access
revenue and since p>cand
dq(pi)
dpi < 0, it induces network i to increase its retail price.
Since under the ECPR a network can increase its revenue by increasing its retail price,
the ECPR induces each network to choose a price higher than the one under a = c0.
Last, consider the following rule ai − c0 = κ(pj − c) where κ(≥ 0) is a constant. For
instances, if κ =1 ,w eh a v et h eM E C P Ra n di fκ =0 , we have the marginal cost pricing.
Then, network i￿s pro￿ti sg i v e nb y :
πi(pi : pj)=αi[R(pi) − f]+καi(1 − αi)[R(pj) − R(pi)].















The ￿rst two terms in (11) are what we found in the ￿rst-order derivative under a = c0
a n dh a v et od ow i t ht h er e t a i lp r o ￿t. The last term in (11) has to do with the access
revenue and, since dRi
dpi > 0,a ni n c r e a s ei nκ induces network i to reduce its retail price.
This implies that the retail price under the marginal cost pricing is higher than the retail
price under the MECPR, which is higher than the retail price under when κ =2(i.e. the
Ramsey price). Note that from (11), when κ =2 , the only price satisfying the ￿rst-order
condition is the Ramsey price.
134R o b u s t n e s s
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results to relaxing some of our assump-
tions.
First, introducing receiver￿s surplus as in Jeon-Laﬀont-Tirole (2004) does not aﬀect
our result as long as the receivers are not charged for the reception. Note ￿rst that
introducing receiver￿s surplus does not aﬀect the Ramsey price which is the lowest price
allowing networks to recover their ￿xed cost (i.e. R(pR)=f). Second in the proofs of
Proposition 1, I only use the three properties regarding market share αi introduced in
Section 2 and these properties remain intact even though receiver surplus is introduced.
In what follows, I examine the robustness of the result to relaxing the full coverage
assumption and introducing the network-based price discrimination.
4.1 Relaxing full coverage
I here assume away the full coverage assumption and assume that
Pn
i=1 αi(p : p,...,p)
strictly decreases with p. We continue to normalize the mass of potential consumers at
one. Since
Pn
i=1 αi(p : p,...,p) represents the total mass of consumers who subscribe to
one of the networks, it cannot be larger than one. In this setting, the Ramsey price is
still characterized by R(pR)=f.L e t αi(pR : pR,...,p R)=αR > 0. Then, we have the
following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose that
Pn
i=1 αi(p : p,...,p) strictly decreases with p.U n d e ra s s u m p -
tion 1, for any demand structure satisfying Properties 1 and 2,
(i) there is a unique linear access pricing rule in ΛL
n de￿ned by aij−c0 = 1
αR(n−1)(pj−c) that
satis￿es a necessary condition to achieve the Ramsey outcome (pi = pR for i =1 ,...,n)
as an equilibrium
(ii) under the rule, pi = pR for i =1 ,...,n is an equilibrium.
Note that the access pricing rule in Proposition 2 generalizes the one in Proposition 1
since under the full coverage, αR = 1
n.
Proof. (i) The ￿rst-order derivative of πi with respect to pi is given by (5). A necessary
condition to implement the Ramsey outcome is that the ￿rst-order derivative is zero at
pi = pR for i =1 ,...,n.S i n c e R(pR)=f and h(pi,p j,c)q(pj)=h(pj,p i,c)q(pi) at the
symmetric equilibrium candidate, the ￿rst and the third terms are zero in (5) at pi = pR
for i =1 ,...,n.S i n c eq(pi)=qR and αi = αR for i =1 ,...,n at the symmetric equilibrium
14candidate, the necessary condition holds only if the following conditions are satis￿ed by
h(pi,p j,c):
1+( n − 1)α
R (h1 − h2)=0
p




R + h3c + h4
i
=0 .
From the two conditions, we ￿nd that h1 =0 ,h 2 = 1
αR(n−1),h 3c + h4 = − c
αR(n−1).T h e r e -
fore, we obtain the unique candidate in the set of linear access pricing rules as follows:




(ii) Given the access pricing rule, network i￿s pro￿ti sg i v e nb y :






αj [R(pj) − R(pi)]
Suppose that all the other networks except network 1 charge pR. Then, because of the
symmetry, we have α2 = ... = αn and network 1￿s pro￿ti sg i v e nb y ;
π1(p1;p
R,...,p
R)=α1 [R(p1) − f]+
1





αR [R(p1) − f],
where α2 = α2(pR;p1,p R,...,pR).N o t e ￿rst that π1 =0when p1 = pR and π1 =0for
p1 ≥ p under assumption 1. Consider any p1 with p1 <p R. Then, from the monotonicity,





have αR < α2 and R(p1) >f, implying π1 < 0 if α1 > 0.
Remark 1: Even though we relax the full coverage assumption, the rule presented
in Proposition 1 implements the Ramsey outcome if the market is mature in that the
total mass of consumers choosing to join one among the networks is equal to one at the
Ramsey price.14 Otherwise, the regulator needs to know αR and in this sense the optimal
14However, there might be multiple symmetric equilibria. Under the access rule described in Proposition















where αi = αi(p;p,...,p) < αR.T h e ￿rst term is negative and the second term is positive. Therefore,




15access pricing rule is informationally demanding. However, even when it is diﬃcult for
the regulator to know αR, this does not imply that she should adopt one of the alternative
access pricing rules presented in Section 2.2. As the comparison of diﬀerent rules in Section
3.4 has shown, the intuition that one can intensify the retail competition by making the
access price that network i pays to other networks increase with its retail price holds
generally. More precisely, since αR ≤ 1/n holds, we have 1
αR(n−1) ≥ n/(n−1). Therefore,
one can use the access pricing rule presented in Proposition 1, aij − c0 = n
n−1(pj − c):
although the equilibrium price under the rule is higher than the Ramsey price, it is
lower than the equilibrium price under any ￿xed access price (larger than the termination
cost), or under the ECPR or under the MECPR. Furthermore, the previous rule is not
informationally demanding.
4.2 Network-based price discrimination
I now introduce network-based price discrimination. Following LRT (1998b), let pi be
network i￿s on-net price and b pi network i￿s oﬀ-net price. For simplicity, I consider the case
of n =2 .N o t e￿rst that the Ramsey outcome is not aﬀected by the network-based price
discrimination. Since the Ramsey outcome can be achieved by the access pricing rule
ai − c0 =2 ( pj − c) without network-based price discrimination, the price discrimination
has no social value in our framework. Consider the following linear access price rule:
ai − c0 = h(pi, b pi,p j, b pj,c)
= h1pi + b h1b pi + h2pj + b h2b pj + h3c + h4,
where each of (h1, b h1,h 2, b h2,h 3,h 4) is a constant. Let b ΛL denote the set of the linear
access pricing rules taking the above form. Since I assume that the regulator chooses
(h1, b h1,h 2, b h2,h 3,h 4) without knowing the demand structure, none of (h1, b h1,h 2, b h2,h 3,k)
can depend on the demand-side information. I have a negative result:
Proposition 3 I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fn e t w o r k - b a s e dp r i c ed i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,t h e r ei sn or u l et o
achieve the Ramsey outcome as an equilibrium among the linear access pricing rules in
b ΛL,
Proof. Network i￿s pro￿ti sg i v e nb y :
πi = αi [αiR(pi)+( 1− αi)R(b pi) − f]
+αi(1 − αi)[q(b pj)h(pi, b pi,p j, b pj,c) − q(b pi)h(pj, b pj,p i, b pi,c)].
16A necessary condition to implement the Ramsey outcome is that the ￿rst-order derivative
is zero at p1 = p2 = b p1 = b p2 = pR. The ￿rst-order condition with respect to pi at
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are not available to the regulator. This proves the result.
In the presence of network-based price discrimination, as long as access prices are not
related to on-net prices, each network has an incentive to increase its on-net price above
the Ramsey price because of its market power. However, in order to induce each network
to charge its on-net price equal to the Ramsey price by making the access prices depend
on the on-net prices, the government must possess precise information about the demand
function as a necessary condition. Therefore, there is no linear access pricing rule that
achieves the Ramsey outcome under the informational constraint described in Section 2.2.
5C o n c l u s i o n
I showed that when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price dis-
crimination, there is a simple access pricing rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as
the unique equilibrium independently of the underlying demand conditions. The rule
is simple and is not informationally demanding: the regulator only needs to know the
marginal costs. The rule intensi￿es retail competition by making the access price that
network i pays to other networks increase with its retail price. Our result implies that
although networks sell diﬀerentiated products, they end up having an equilibrium with
zero pro￿t.15
I showed that the key insight is valid in a general framework of competition among
n-networks. Although the optimal rule achieving the Ramsey outcome can be information-
ally demanding if the full coverage assumption does not hold, I explained intuitively that
the optimal access pricing rule conditional on full coverage, which is not informationally
15This can reduce each network￿s incentive to invest in infrastructure. If this incentive is a central issue,
one can study the optimal access pricing rule focusing on the trade-oﬀ between investment incentive and
retail competition. See Valletti and Cambini (forthcoming) for the study of investment incentive.
17demanding, performs better in terms of retail price competition than any ￿xed access price
(larger than the termination cost) or the ECPR or the MECPR. I also found that there is
no simple rule achieving the Ramsey outcome when networks can use network-based price
discrimination since preventing each network from exercising its market power in terms of
its on-net price requires the regulator to have very precise information about the demand
structure as a necessary condition. Therefore, banning network price discrimination in-
creases social welfare in our case. The result that network-based price discrimination can
reduce social welfare is reminiscent of the ￿nding in Jeon-Laﬀont-Tirole (2004) in which
they show that network-based price discrimination can generate connectivity breakdown.
F i n a l l y ,i tw o u l db ei n t e r e s t i n gt oa p p l ym ya p p r o a c ht ot h ec a s eo fn e t w o r kc o m p e t i -
tion with two-part tariﬀs. The question is to know whether pegging access prices to retail
prices can help internalize call externalities even in the absence of reception charges since
reception charges are not used in many countries.16
Appendix
In the appendix, I prove four lemmas and this establishes that there is no asymmetric
equilibrium when n =2 .
Lemma 1 There exists no ￿cornered-market￿ equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that network 1 corners the market with π1 > 0. Then, network 2
can charge p2 = p1 and make a pro￿t π1/2 > 0 and therefore we get a contradiction.
Suppose that network 1 corners the market with π1 =0 . This implies that p1 = pR or
p1 = p. The proof of Proposition 1 in Section 3.3 has shown that if p1 = p,n e t w o r k2
can realize a strictly positive pro￿tb yc h a r g i n gp2 = pm. Suppose p1 = pR.F r o m t h e
proof of Proposition 1 in Section 3.2, we know that any price p2 diﬀerent from pR and p
and satisfying α2(p2;pR) > 0 makes π2 < 0.H o w e v e r , ( p1 = pR,p 2 = p)c a n n o tb ea n
equilibrium since p1 has an incentive to deviate to pm. The only remaining possibility is
p1 = p2 = pR but then α1 = α2 =1 /2, which is not a cornered-market equilibrium.
Lemma 2 If (p1,p 2) is an asymmetric equilibrium with p1 <p 2,t h e np2 >p m.
16Jeon-Laﬀont-Tirole (2004) show that when receivers derive surplus from communications and net-
works can charge call receptions, there is a unique access price implementing the Ramsey outcome.
18Proof. Given an asymmetric equilibrium (p1,p 2),n e t w o r ki￿s equilibrium pro￿ti s
πi(pi : pj)=αi [R(pi) − f]+2 αi(1 − αi)[R(pj) − R(pi)].
This must be higher than the pro￿tt h a tn e t w o r ki obtains by deviating to pj: the following
inequalities must hold
π1(p1 : p2) ≥
1
2
[R(p2) − f];( 1 2 )
π2(p2 : p1) ≥
1
2
[R(p1) − f].( 1 3 )




)[R(p1) − R(p2)] ≥ 0.
Since αi > 1
2, a necessary condition to have R(p1) ≥ R(p2) and p1 <p 2 is p2 >p m.
Lemma 3 If (p1,p 2) is an equilibrium, then pi cannot be lower than the Ramsey price
and cannot be higher than p: pR ≤ pi ≤ p for i =1and 2.
Proof. Step 1:I f(p1,p 2) is an equilibrium, then pi cannot be lower than pR.
We cannot have an equilibrium in which pi <p R for i =1and 2 since then at least
one ￿rm has a strictly negative pro￿t. Suppose p1 <p R ≤ p2.F i r s t , α2 > 0 requires
p2 < p, which implies R(p2) ≥ f.I f(p1,p 2) is an equilibrium, network 1 must not have
an incentive to deviate to p2. In other words, the following inequality should hold;














[R(p2) − f] ≥ 0.
Since we have α1 > 1
2,R(p1) <f≤ R(p2), the left hand side is strictly negative and
t h e r e f o r ew eh a v eac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Step 2:I f(p1,p 2) is an equilibrium, then pi cannot be higher than p.
We cannot have an equilibrium in which pi > p for i =1and 2 since then at least
one ￿rm has a strictly negative pro￿t. Suppose p1 ≤ p<p 2. We distinguish two cases:






p1 = pR,p 2 > p
·
cannot be an equilibrium
since then network 1 corners the market but no cornered-equilibrium exists from Lemma
1.
19Case 1: p1 ∈ (pm,p] and p<p 2.






1) ≥ f.I n
order to have (p1,p 2) as an equilibrium, network 1 should not have an incentive to deviate
to p0
1. Therefore, the following inequality should hold:













1;p2) > α1 = α1(p1;p2) > 1
2. Since R(p1) ≥ f>R (p2), the left hand
side is strictly smaller than the right hand side and therefore we have a contradiction.





We have R(p1) >f>R (p2).N e t w o r k1 ￿ sp r o ￿ti sg i v e nb y :
π1(p1 : p2)=α1 [R(p1) − f]+2 α1(1 − α1)[R(p2) − R(p1)]
= α1 {(2α1 − 1)[R(p1) − f]+2 ( 1− α1)[R(p2) − f]}.







Network 2 should have no incentive to deviate to p1:








(1 − α1)(2α1 − 1)
1





Therefore, we must have π1(p1 : p2)=0and π2(p2 : p1)=1
2 [R(p1) − f]. Then, there is






that allows it to corner the market and to realize the pro￿to fR(p0
1)−f>0.
Therefore, we have a contradiction.
Lemma 4 There is no asymmetric equilibrium with pi ∈ (pm,p] for i =1or 2.
Proof. Case 1: pi ∈ (pm,p] for i =1and 2





1) >f . Network 1 should not have any incentive to
deviate to p0
1:













1;p2) > α1 = α1(p1;p2) > 1
2. Since R(p1) >R (p2) ≥ f, the left hand side
is strictly smaller than the right hand side and therefore we have a contradiction.




and p2 ∈ (pm,p].
If α2 =0 , network 1 corners the market and we have a contradiction from Lemma 1.
Therefore, we consider α2 > 0, which implies that one cannot have
‡
p1 = pR,p 2 = p
·
as
an equilibrium. This in turn implies that one of the two following inequalities R(p1) ≥ f
or R(p2) ≥ f must hold strictly. Network 2 should have no incentive to deviate to p1:

















[R(p1) − f] ≥ 0.
Since α2 < 1
2,α2(1−α2) < 1
4 and either (R(p1) ≥ f and R(p2) >f) or (R(p1) >fand R(p2) ≥ f),
the left hand side is strictly negative. Therefore, we have a contradiction.
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